

Public Key Infrastructure

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Internet Security Protocols
Ali Aydın Selçuk

Public Key Infrastructure

- A system to securely distribute & manage public keys.
- Important for wide-area trust management (for e-government, e-commerce, e-mail, etc.)
- Ideally consists of
 - a certification authority
 - certificate repositories
 - a certificate revocation mechanism (CRLs, etc.)
- Many models possible: monopoly, oligarchy, anarchy, etc.

Monopoly Model

- Single organization is the CA for everyone
- Shortcomings:
 - no such universally-trusted organization
 - requires everyone to authenticate physically with the same CA
 - compromise recovery is difficult (due to single embedded public key)
 - once established, CA can abuse its position (excessive pricing, etc.)
 - requires perfect security at CA

Monopoly with Registration Authorities

- CA trusts other organizations (RAs) to check identities, do the initial authentication
- Solves the problem of physically meeting the CA. Other problems remain.
- RAs can be incorporated into other models too

Delegated CAs

- Root CA certifies lower-level CAs to certify others
- All verifiers trust the root CA & verify certificate chains beginning at the root (i.e., the root CA is the *trust anchor* of all verifiers)
- E.g., a national PKI, where a root CA certifies institutions, ISPs, universities who in turn certify their members
- Limitations are similar to monopoly with RAs

Oligarchy

- Many root CAs exist trusted by verifiers
- The model of web security
- Solves the problems of single authority (e.g., excessive pricing)
- Disadvantages:
 - n security-sensitive sites instead of one. Compromise of any one compromises the whole system
 - users can easily be tricked into trusting fake CAs. (depending on implementation)

Anarchy

- Each user decides whom to trust & how to authenticate their public keys
- Certificates issued by arbitrary parties can be stored in public databases, which can be searched to find a path of trust to a desired party
- Works well for informal, not-so-sensitive applications (e.g., PGP)

Revocation

- Mechanisms to cancel certificates compromised before expiration
- Certificate Revocation List (CRL): list of revoked certificates, published periodically by the CA
- Delta CRLs: Only the changes since the last issue are published
- Online Revocation Servers: No CRL is published. Verifier queries a central server to check if a certificate has been revoked.

Finding Certificate Chains

- Can be sent by the subject sending its public key to the verifier (e.g., SSL)
- A directory naming structure can be followed (e.g., LDAP, DNSsec)

X.509 Certificates

- Common standard for certificate format
- PKIX: Internet standard for X.509-based PKI
- Fields (X.509 v3):
 - version
 - serial number
 - signature algorithm identifier
 - issuer
 - validity period
 - subject
 - subject public key information
 - signature
 - standard extensions (key usage limitation, etc.)
 - other extensions (application & CA specific)