Kerberos
with comments on WEP

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Internet Security Protocols
Ali Aydın Selçuk

A simple protocol:

Alice, Bob

Problem: Potential delayed key delivery to Bob.
(besides others)

Another simple protocol:

Alice, Bob

Problems:
• No freshness guarantee for $K_{AB}$
• Alice & Bob need to authenticate

Needham-Schroeder Protocol
Basic Kerberos Protocol

Alice

\[ N_1, \text{Alice, Bob} \]

\[ K_A[N_1, \text{Bob, } K_{AB}, \text{ticket}_B] \]

\[ \text{where } \text{ticket}_B = K_B[K_{AB}, \text{Alice, expiration time}] \]

\[ K_{AB}[T] \]

Bob

T: timestamp

KDC

Kerberos

- Cryptographic authentication for distributed systems.
- Designed as the security protocol of Project Athena at MIT in the '80s.
- Supported widely in current systems: Linux, Windows, Mac OS X, FreeBSD, Oracle... for network authentication.

Kerberos Keys

- Each “principal” shares a “master key” with KDC
- \( K_A \): Alice’s master key (pwd based for users). Used for initial authentication
- \( S_A \): Alice’s session key. Created after initial authentication, used instead of \( K_A \).
- \( K_{AB} \): Alice-Bob session key.
- “Ticket Granting Tickets” (TGT):
  - issued to Alice by KDC after login
  - contains \( S_A \) encrypted with \( K_{KDC} \)
  - used to obtain session key \( K_{AB} \)

Kerberos

- Requirements:
  - Security, reliability, transparency, scalability
- Based on symmetric-key authentication with KDC
- Advantages:
  - secure authentication
  - single sign-on (!)
  - secure data flow
Logging into the Network

Alice, pwd → Alice needs a TGT → Kₐ(Sₐ, TGT) → KDC

(doesn’t protect against dictionary attacks with eavesdropping)

Logging into the Network (cont’d)

The workstation,
• converts Alice’s password into a DES key
• when receives the credentials from the server, decrypts them using this DES key
• if decrypts correctly, authentication is successful
• discards Alice’s master key; retains the TGT.
• TGT contains all the information KDC needs about Alice’s session; hence KDC can work without remembering any volatile data.

Accessing a Remote Principal

Alice, pwd → Alice's terminal → Kₐ(Sₐ, TGT) → KDC

Afterwards, the traffic between Alice & Bob can be
- unprotected
- authenticated
- encrypted & authenticated

Multiple Realms

Alice, pwd → Alice’s terminal

"Alice", "Bob", TGT, Sₐ(timestamp)


Kₐ("Alice", KₐB), KₐB{timestamp}

KₐB{timestamp+1}

• KDCₐ & KDCₐ must have registered with each other
Message Authentication

- Back in the '80s, MACs were not an established concept.
- Kerberos initially used CRC-32 checksum, with DES encryption as the MAC.
- Non-crypto checksum, with encryption:
  - Not ok if message is in cleartext. (we know this)
  - May be ok if message is encrypted too.
  - With block cipher: Kerberos (mostly ok)
  - With a stream cipher: May be with MD5 checksum.
  - Definitely not with a stream cipher and a linear checksum as CRC; just as WEP did!

Major Problems with WEP

- WEP: "Wired Equivalent Privacy", the first encryption protocol for 802.11 Wi-Fi.
- Major problems:
  - Using a stream cipher (RC4) for challenge-response authentication (!!)
  - Using a 24-bit IV
  - Using a linear checksum (CRC-32) with a stream cipher (RC4) as the MAC

Message Authentication in WEP

- MAC algorithm:
  - Compute CRC-32 checksum over the message.
  - Encrypt both the message and the checksum with RC4.
- Problem: RC4 is a stream cipher.
  - You can do controlled changes on the message and fix the checksum over the ciphertext!
- Can be more significant than just flipping a few bits.

Attack on MAC in WEP

Attacker can get the whole plaintext packets by flipping bits over the ciphertext:
- Parts of the plaintext is predictable (e.g., the upper-layer protocol headers).
- Attacker sniffs a packet and changes its IP address to his machine from the ciphertext.
  (If the attacker’s machine is outside the firewall, the TCP port number could also be changed, to 80 for example, which most firewalls would not block.)
- Hence, the attacker obtains the decrypted text without breaking the encryption!
More Attacks on WEP

• The final nail in the coffin:
  (Fluhrer, Mantin, Shamir, 2001)
  The way RC4 is used in WEP can be broken completely: When IV is known, it is possible to get k in RC4(IV || k).

• WEP2 proposal: 128-bit key, 128-bit IV.
  This can be broken even faster!

Replacements for WEP

• WPA
  – encryption: RC4, but with a complex IV-key mixing
  – integrity: cryptographic checksum (by lightweight Michael algorithm)
  – replay protection: 48-bit seq.no.; also used as IV

• WPA2 (long-term replacement, 802.11i std.)
  – encryption: AES-CTR mode
  – integrity: AES-CBC-MAC