

## Final Exam

January 10, 2005


**Question 1.** (*60 pts.*) Answer briefly each of the following questions:

- a. What are the differences between a MAC and a digital signature? What are the respective advantages of each?
- b. Does collision-resistance imply one-wayness? Explain briefly.
- c. A dishonest dealer might distribute “bad” shares for a Blakley threshold scheme, i.e., shares for which different  $t$ -subsets determine different keys. Given all  $n$  shares, we could test the consistency of the shares by computing the key for every one of the  $\binom{n}{t}$   $t$ -subsets of participants, and verifying that the same key is computed in each case. Describe a more efficient method for testing the consistency of the shares.
- d. What is the purpose of the salt in password-based authentication systems? Describe how it is used when a user logs into the system from a terminal.
- e. What is the main advantage of the Expanded Needham-Schroeder Protocol over the basic one? How is this feature achieved?
- f. What is the “single sign-on” property? How does Kerberos provide it?
- g. Where would you prefer using an anarchical PKI over an hierarchical one? Where would you prefer an hierarchical one?
- h. What is NAT? Why is it problematic for IPsec AH?
- i. Why is the TCP sequence number a possible source of complication for the IV attacks on the TCP port number? Under what kind of ISN (initial sequence number) generation schemes is this problem easy to deal with?
- j. Given that CBC-MAC is provably secure as a MAC, why does it fail in PEM? Explain briefly.
- k. What are the major risks of doing e-commerce over SSL/TLS? How does SET deal with these problems?
- l. Why doesn't it suffice to be undetectable for a watermarking scheme to be secure? Explain the concept with an attack that doesn't require detection.

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**Question 2.** (20 pts.)

Consider the following EKE-type protocol, where  $E$  is a per-session public key generated by Alice's terminal,  $W$  is the shared secret derived from Alice's password, and  $K$  is the session key to be used.



- Why is this protocol not secure?
- Describe a simple modification to secure this protocol.

**Question 3.** (20 pts.)

- Briefly describe how a puzzle scheme is used against denial of service (DoS) attacks in cryptographic authentication protocols.
- How can you make such a puzzle scheme adaptive so that the server responds to increasing demand with increasingly difficult puzzles.
- Describe how you can make the server remain stateless until the client is authenticated. The system must take caution that the same client cannot use the same answer over a long period of time.
- Why is a one-way hash function preferred in these puzzle schemes rather than mathematical problems, such as factoring an integer of a certain size?

*Good luck*