

Midterm Exam

November 2, 2006

Question 1. (*40 pts.*) Answer briefly each of the following questions:

- a. What is the Kerckhoffs' principle? Why is that principle important?
- b. In which of the ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, and CTR modes of operation, is decryption parallelizable?
- c. Why is collision resistance a requirement for cryptographic hash functions? Explain with an attack scenario.
- d. Consider "randomized hashing" where a signer to sign a message m first generates a sufficiently long (say 128-bit) random r , computes $H(r||m)$, and signs it along with r . Would collision resistance be a requirement for H in this case? Why?
- e. Can the Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem be used as a signature algorithm in a straightforward manner—using the private key operation for signing and the public key operation for verification? Why/why not? (Assume the input is always hashed before signing; hence existential forgery attacks are not applicable.)
- f. Suppose all members in a group use 5 as their RSA encryption exponent. What is the risk of sending the same message to multiple members in such a system? How does PKCS solve this problem?
- g. Consider the signature scheme obtained from the graph isomorphism zero-knowledge protocol as discussed in class. Why do the graphs generated per-signature must be included in the hash that produces the challenge sequence? Explain briefly.
- h. What is the limitation of simple secret sharing systems that function sharing schemes aim to solve? Discuss briefly.

Turn the page

Question 2. (20 pts.) Being a finite-state machine an LFSR eventually cycles. An LFSR is said to have maximal period if, when started at any non-zero state, it visits all non-zero states before it enters a state for a second time—i.e., has a cycle length of $2^n - 1$ for any non-zero starting value. Also recall that the cells in the LFSR that are included in the feedback function are called *taps*. Prove that an LFSR can have maximal period only if

- a. the leading cell x_1 is a tap,
- b. the number of taps is even.

(Hint: Show that when one of these conditions is not satisfied, there is a state vector that gets into a cycle immediately.)

Question 3. (20 pts.) Alice and Bob are very good friends and don't mind sharing the same RSA modulus n . Of course, to have their own different private keys, they use different public exponents, e_1, e_2 . Moreover e_1 and e_2 are relatively prime. A common friend Charlie sends a message x to both, encrypting it with their respective RSA keys, $y_1 = x^{e_1} \bmod n$, $y_2 = x^{e_2} \bmod n$. Show how Eve, who knows the public keys of Alice and Bob and observes the ciphertexts y_1 and y_2 , can find out the message x .

Question 4. (20 pts.) Consider an ElGamal encryption system with public keys (p, g, β) and private key α , where p is a large prime, g is a generator of Z_p^* , and $\beta = g^\alpha \bmod p$.

- a. Describe an (n, n) function sharing scheme to share the decryption function, which is unconditionally secure.
- b. Discuss how this idea can be generalized to a (t, n) threshold scheme for an arbitrary $t \leq n$ using Shamir secret sharing and Lagrange interpolation. Also explain why a straightforward implementation of Shamir is not possible here.
- c. Complete your threshold decryption scheme in part (b) by a special selection of the ElGamal parameters. (Hint: Take p to be a safe prime; and use $g' = g^i$ instead of g for some particular i .)

Good luck