


Midterm Exam

November 15, 2012

Question 1. (*40 pts.*) Answer briefly each of the following questions:

- a. What is Kerckhoffs' principle? Why is that principle important?
- b. What are the four basic operations in the AES round function? Which are responsible for confusion? Which are responsible for diffusion?
- c. In general, the decryption speed of a block cipher algorithm is considered to be less important than its encryption speed. Why?
- d. In which of the ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, and CTR modes of operation, is speeding up *encryption* possible by precomputation? By parallel computation?
- e. For a hash function, does collision resistance imply second preimage resistance? Explain briefly.
- f. What is the existential forgery attack against textbook RSA signatures? How does PKCS (v1) solve this problem?
- g. What is "key escrow"? Why is it an inherent feature in ID-based encryption?
- h. What is the limitation of a simple secret sharing system that function sharing aims to solve? Discuss briefly.

Question 2. (*20 pts.*) Consider the following mode of encryption with three keys k , k_1 , k_2 , where k is of the length of the block size and k_1 and k_2 are of the length of the key size (denoted by ℓ) of the block cipher E . (E.g., for DES, k would be 64 bits, and k_1 and k_2 would be 56 bits each.)



- Describe the decryption operation for this mode of encryption.
- Describe a known-plaintext attack with a few input blocks where the attacker can discover the full key (k, k_1, k_2) with approximately $2 \cdot 2^\ell$ runs of the encryption/decryption algorithm. (You can assume as much memory as you need for the attack.)
- Comment on the security of this mode of encryption as a potential way of strengthening DES with an increased key size.

Question 3. (20 pts.) Suppose that we want to develop a MAC scheme which is as secure as Triple-DES CBC-MAC and at the same time as efficient as Single-DES CBC-MAC. We come up with the following idea: Except the last plaintext block, we apply Single-DES CBC with key K_1 and for the last one, we apply 2-key Triple-DES CBC-MAC using keys (K_1, K_2, K_1) . The result of the Triple-DES is output as the MAC.

- Approximately how many message-MAC pairs would you need to observe in order to find two different messages with the same MAC value?
- Describe how an attacker who has observed two different messages with the same MAC value can break this MAC scheme completely by recovering the keys with a time complexity about the same as that of breaking a Single DES encryption.

Question 4. (20 pts.) On ElGamal signatures. (You can assume that g has a prime order q .)

- Show that if Eve can learn the value of k Alice used in an ElGamal signature, she can compute Alice's private key.
- Suppose Alice's random number generator is broken and it always produces the same k value. How can Eve detect this from the signatures Alice issues?
- Knowing that Alice used the same k value in two different signatures, describe how Eve can compute that k value used, and then Alice's private key α .

Good luck!